Nicholas Waterbury

In 2022 Illinois voters were faced with a ballot measure asking them whether they supported adding a Workers’ Rights Amendment (WRA) to the state constitution. Despite countervailing forces that might have made passage difficult, the amendment passed. We explore whether support for collective bargaining rights and union protections followed a predictably partisan pattern in Illinois, or whether support for the amendment was shaped by arguments, endorsements, or other voter demographics. Fielding a survey experiment with a representative sample of 1,000 Illinois voters, we find that Democrats were more likely to support the WRA in general, but that Republicans were more likely to support it following exposure to rights-based arguments emphasizing better pay, benefits, and conditions for workers. We also find that Democrats were more likely to support it following exposure to public sector union endorsements, but that private sector endorsements did not sway Republicans. More broadly, these findings suggest future opportunities to influence potentially skeptical audiences when it comes to ballot measures related to the labor movement.

The confirmation of lower federal court judges heavily depends on the application of two Senate norms: Senatorial Courtesy and the Blue Slip. But prior work largely ignores State Representation-a norm whereby each U.S. Courts of Appeals judgeship is assigned to a particular state in the Circuit. Given this norm, senators expect that the President will nominate someone from the same state as the departing circuit judge. However, presidents fail to follow this norm nearly 25 percent of the time. This research analyzes how state representation-specifically the president's decision to defy the norm-influences the confirmation process. We argue that ignoring state representation norms increases the level of conflict over a nominee. As a result, both previous and new home-state senators will have some sway over their colleagues. Our results reveal several implications of violating the norm of state representation. The (1) probability of the Senate confirming a nominee and (2) time to final action on a nomination are decreasing in the ideological distance between the previous home state senators and the president. Additionally, if the new home state senators reveal public opposition to a nomination, both (a) the likelihood of rejection and (b) time to final action increase.

Many court observers have argued that judges are capable of avoiding the use of extraneous factors in decision-making. This study examines the influence of seemingly irrelevant heuristics on real-world courtroom proceedings. Drawing on theories from neighboring disciplines, I hypothesize that physically attractive attorneys have greater success in US federal court. Using a generalizable causal inference strategy and a dataset of over 1,000 cases and 3,000 votes, I find support for my expectations using multiple measures of attractiveness. These findings raise serious normative concerns about equality and underscore the need to adjust traditional models of judicial behavior to account for inherent biases.

Among political institutions in the United States, state courts are surprisingly susceptible to ideological extremism because of the non-uniform ways judges are selected. In this paper we examine the effect of selection methods on the ideological composition of state supreme courts. We theorize that methods involving partisan politics lead to more ideological justices and that, among that subset, Republican affiliated justices will be the most extreme. We test our expectations using a dataset of over 600 state supreme court selections between 1961-2011. Using a contemporary matching algorithm designed to maximize causal identification, we find support for our hypotheses. Our results speak to the consequences of federalism in court composition and offer an insight into how polarization manifests in the judiciary.

In the last decade, voters in several US states and local municipalities have faced ballot initiatives on adopting some form of ranked choice voting (RCV) in their elections. The results of such proposals, however, have been mixed and unpredictable. What then explains the variation in American voter support for RCV? While existing research suggests several demographic factors may drive voter support, we theorize that an under-explored explanation for variation in voter support may be the policy positions of political elites. In this project, we expand on previous theories regarding the impact of elite cues and affective partisanship. Using a survey experiment with a representative sample of Americans, we find that partisan attitudes towards RCV are impacted by exposure to statements about RCV made by a respondent’s own political party. In contrast, we do not find that attitudes towards RCV are shaped by the position of a respondent’s out-party. We also find that attitudes are not significantly influenced by specific party elites like Donald Trump, but that they are by a fictional non-partisan information source. Our findings speak to the relevance of political elites and affective partisanship in shaping voter attitudes towards electoral reforms

The academic debate on how voters decide which candidates to support often centers on whether they prioritize their personal preferences or consider who can beat the opposing candidate, known as "sincere" and "strategic" voting, respectively. However, American research on voting behavior has largely focused on first-past-the-post (FPTP) elections. Considering jurisdictions are adopting new electoral systems such as ranked-choice voting (RCV) this leads to several questions about the impact of system adoption on voter decision-making. Particularly, does the voter decision-making process differ depending on the system used? To investigate the impact of RCV on voter decision-making and understand if voter decision-making varies across electoral systems, we conducted a survey experiment in a federal senate election. Our findings indicate that in comparison to FPTP elections, RCV elections may lead to decreases in both sincere and strategic voting. Instead, RCV appears to increase voter uncertainty around how to decide which candidates to support and leads to voters who appear to be neither sincere nor strategic. These findings have important implications for electoral systems, voters, democracy, and representation more broadly.

In 2022, Evanston became the second locality in Illinois to adopt Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV) as part of their local elections. In doing so, Evanston joined a movement that began in the early 2000s with major cities across America adopting RCV as the electoral system utilized in their local elections. As the use of RCV spreads across the nation and Illinois, policymakers may wonder about voter attitudes toward such policies. Utilizing survey data collected of a representative sample of Illinoisans in Fall of 2022, we explore voter attitudes towards the use of RCV and additional electoral systems in Illinois. As part of the write up, we define and discuss each electoral system explored. Through our analysis, we find that a majority of voters across the state support all electoral system options explored, though there is important variation across key groups and possible systems. We explore these results and their implications for elections at the local level across Illinois.

As the chief litigator for the United States government, the Solicitor General plays a crucial role in the justices' decision-making process. The justices and the Solicitor General share a mutually-beneficial relationship that is reinforced by the Solicitor General's willingness to provide legal advice when asked. In this paper, we examine if and how this relationship changes when the Solicitor General files a formal "confession of error." Using data on confessions filed between the 1979 and 2014 terms, we find the justices are significantly less likely to support the Solicitor General's position at multiple stages of the Court's decision-making process if the Solicitor General confesses error in light of a policy change. This punishment is harshest when the Solicitor General provides advice as an amicus curiae participant, but it is only temporary. These results provide new insight into the scope and limitations of benefits allotted to the Court's most prominent litigator.

This paper explores how political scandals are discounted over time. Previous research has shown that voters respond disproportionately to recent economic conditions when evaluating incumbents. We argue that voters discount not only the performance of incumbents in office but also information about their personal character, largely due to accessibility biases. Building on a comprehensive database of congressional scandals covering the last four decades, we show that the electoral consequences of political scandals fade fairly quickly. Only cases emerging in the election-year systematically affect the vote share of incumbents. Moral scandals are the exception, with negative effects persisting over the entire term. In line with the mechanism proposed, additional analyses suggest this pattern results from disproportional levels of media attention, making moral scandals more easily retrieved from memory. The results broaden our understanding of the nature of myopic voting and provide an explanation for the increasing reliance on negative campaigning.

From humble origins in the 1940s, the study of judicial behavior—how and why judges make the choices they do —has grown into an interdisciplinary, worldwide enterprise. This chapter traces the evolution of the field, with emphasis on key developments in theory and data. Also considered is the explosion of substantive topics falling under the rubric of “judicial behavior.” The conclusion turns from the past and present to the future, highlighting several promising avenues for forward movement.